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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
European Communities*
I. Constitutional and Institutional Matters
A. COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (the ECJ) had a further
opportunity to demarcate the respective spheres of competence of community
law and national law (of a Community Member State) in Demouche v. Fonds
de Garantie Automobile.' There, the original claimant had been injured in
France by a car registered and insured in West Germany, driven by a West
German national who was unlicensed to drive at the time. Under relevant
Community legislation, Directive 72/166/EEC, each Member State was
required to set up or designate a national bureau representing automobile
insurers established within the State, and to ensure that these national bureaux,
by collective agreements and arrangements between themselves, operate the
"Green Card" scheme. This provides minimum automobile insurance cover
for vehicles while driven in Member States other than the State of registration
of the vehicle, 2 through claim- and loss-sharing arrangements between insurers
represented through their bureaux. Pursuant to the various national legislative
or regulative measures taken in compliance with the Directive, the national
bureaux had made a Uniform Agreement and a Supplementary Agreement in
implementing the scheme laid down in the Directive. However, on this
occasion a dispute had arisen between the French and West German bureaux
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1. 1 COMMON MKT. L.R. 544 (1989).
2. Which is evidenced by a document to be carried on the vehicle while "out-of-state," called
a "green card," although frequently neither green nor a card.
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as to which of them, on the facts, was liable under the terms of the
Agreements to pay the claimant and to recover from the relevant insurer if
possible. The national court trying the dispute considered that the Agreements,
being clearly intended to give effect to the Directive, must be construed in the
light of the Directive, but found itself in some doubt as to the correct
interpretation of the Directive on the point in issue. The court therefore sought
a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on a point of community law, under the
procedure laid down in article 177, EEC. The ECJ, however, held itself
incompetent to receive the reference under article 177 on the ground that what
was in issue was the construction of the Agreements, which were ordinary
contracts between ordinary commercial parties, and therefore not subject to
community law. The issue should be decided by reference only to the
(national) law governing the contracts and only a national court could decide
which law that was, and what it required in the present case. That the
contracts were meant to give effect to requirements of community law did not
by itself make them community instruments capable of being the subject of a
judgment on community law by the ECJ. The general principle behind this
judgment, that not every response to community legislation, or implementation
of a community policy, becomes thereby subject to community law, is
therefore some answer to those critics who detect in the ECJ a tendency
constantly to expand the realm of community law at the expense of what an
American would call "states rights."
B. RIGHTS OF COMMUNITY NATIONALS AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINTS
In addition to the specific procedures provided by community law (for
example, relating to anticompetitive or abusive behavior, unauthorized
Member State subsidies, and dumping, unfair subsidies, or illicit commercial
practices originating in non-Member States), 3 whereby interested parties
claiming to have been injured in some way by the acts complained of may
motivate the EC Commission to investigate, and possibly to take action
against the perpetrators, the Community has just introduced a new "Form for
Complaint of Failure to Comply with Community Law,'"4 of completely
general scope and application in any such alleged failure of compliance. While
not limited to such cases, it is envisaged that the new form will be particularly
useful to the Commission in bringing rapidly to its attention defaults by
Member States' governments in implementing community rules on the free
movement of goods and provision of services across frontiers, especially
where these prejudice the creation of the "single internal market" after 1992.
3. See Regional Developments: European Communities, 21 INT'L LAW. 899, 1211 (1987);
22 INT'L LAW. 575 (1988); 23 INT'L LAW. 565 (1989).
4. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 26) 6 (1989); 54 COMMON MKT. L.R. 617 (1989).
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II. Competition (Antitrust) Law
A. THE CONCEPT OF AN UNDERTAKING
The entities capable of violating Community competition law, apart from
Member State governments in certain respects, are "undertakings," a term not
defined in the relevant legislation but the subject of continuing judicial
interpretation. In Corinne Bodson v. Pompes Funebres des Rgions Libirges,5
certain French local government bodies, which are charged under French Law
with the provision of public funeral services, delegated performance of these
services exclusively to the defendants (PFRL) in exchange for promises that
defendants would only charge the "customers" prices within a range fixed by the
municipalities.
The ECJ held that this agreement could not violate article 85, EEC,6 since
although PFRL was an undertaking, the municipalities were not, insofar as
they were acting as public authorities discharging public functions, as here.
However, as public authorities, they were capable of violating article 90(1),
EEC,7 which is not limited to the behavior of (Member State) national
governments; and they would be in such violation here if, for example, they
had fixed the maxima in their price ranges too high, thereby permitting PFRL
to abuse its dominance, through its exclusive access to the "public funeral"
market, by charging excessive prices, contrary to article 86, EEC. 8 It should
be noted that this judgment leaves open the possibility that a municipal
government or other public body could be found to be an undertaking insofar
as it was engaged in purely commercial or private activity, and not in
discharging public duties, and this seems to have happened to some extent
with respect to Belgian public water authorities in the case NAVEWA-
ANSEA U.9
In Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v. Sociale Dienst' the ECJ held that
agreements between holiday tour operators on the one hand, and travel agents
who actually concluded the travel and accommodation contracts with the clients
on the other, were agreements between undertakings capable of violating article
85(1), EEC. The operators and agents had argued that the travel agents merely
performed as agents for, or as auxiliaries of, the operators for the purposes of
5. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 157) 5 (1988), [1988] 4 COMMON MKT. L.R. ANTI-TRUST
SuPP. 569.
6. Which inter alia prohibits anticompetitive agreements between undertakings.
7. Which, broadly speaking, prohibits Member State governments from assisting or encour-
aging undertakings to violate the competition rules.
8. Which prohibits abuses of a dominant position by an undertaking.
9. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 167) 39 (1982); IAZ Int'l Belgium SA v. Commission of the
European Communities, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3369, 41 COMMON MKT. L.R. 276 (1984).
10. [198914 COMMON MKT. L.R. ANTI-TRUST Supp. 213; see infra text accompanying note 21.
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making contracts between the clients and the operators, and were not therefore
separate undertakings, but merely part of the undertaking of the relevant
operator. The ECJ rejected this argument, pointing out that the travel agents
normally acted for a great many operators simultaneously, frequently made
bookings not involving operators at all, and to some extent gave the clients
impartial advice on the choice of a tour; these functions indicated they had an
economic status independent of the tour operators they served. This case is
therefore in line with previous ECJ judgments on the status of "agents" as
separate undertakings," but it does serve further to clarify relationships in the
transport field.
B. DISTRIBUTION, FRANCHISING, AND LICENSING AGREEMENTS
In the period under review the Community has enacted its promised "block
exemption" regulations on franchise agreements and know-how licensing
agreements, that is, Regulations 4087/8812 and 556/89,13 respectively. Both
regulations, like all "block exemption" regulations, have the effect of exempt-
ing agreements, decisions, and practices falling within the terms specified therein
from the prohibition of article 85(1), EEC, pursuant to the exempting power
provided for in article 85(3), EEC. There is no space here to go into the detail
of these rather technical enactments. Suffice it to say that Regulation 4087/88
follows the general principles laid down by the ECJ in the Pronuptia 14 Case, and
Regulation 556/89 follows as far as possible the principles already adopted for
patent license agreements, in Regulation 2349/84, 15 with necessary adjustments
for the different characteristics of know-how.
C. TRANSPORT
The ECJ had once again to review the compatibility of the national regulation
of air transport with EC competition law, in Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale
zur Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs 16 (the Silver Line Case). As is
well-known, air tariffs are generally fixed by bi- or multi-lateral agreements
between the airlines and the States concerned, and the airlines are only licensed
to overfly or land in a State when acting according to agreements to which that
State was a party, or which it approved. Consequently, actual rates for
substantially the same journey can vary according to the place of issue of the
ticket. Here ASF and Silver Line were two Frankfurt travel agents who sold
11. Especially Suiker Unie (The Sugar Cartel Case), 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1663.
12. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 359)46 (1988), 11989] 4 COMM. MKT. L.R. ANTI-TRUST SUPP. 387.
13. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 1 (1989).
14. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Schillgallis, 1986 E. Comm.'Ct. J. Rep. 353, 45 COMMON MKT.
L.R. 414 (1986).
15. 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984).
16. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 122) 4 (1989), [1989] 4 COMMON MKT. L.R. ANTI-TRUST
Supp. 486.
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tickets to customers wishing to fly from Frankfurt to Tokyo which were issued in
Lisbon for Lisbon-Frankfurt-Tokyo flights, these being actually cheaper than
Frankfurt-Tokyo tickets issued in West Germany. However, West German law
mandated that only (the dearer) tickets issued in West Germany could be sold
there. ZBUW, an anti-unfair-competition association, obtained an injunction
against the travel agents, which was ultimately the subject of an article 177,
EEC, reference from the Federal Supreme Court to the ECI.
In a comprehensive judgment the ECJ considered the entire variety of ways
in which both governmental and private regulatory practices could violate the
EC rules. As regards article 85(1), EEC, it held that a distinction must now be
drawn between alleged violations affecting flights internal to a Member State or
between a Member State and a non-Member State, on the one hand, and flights
between Member States on the other. The former were still governed by the
principles enunciated in the Nouvelles Fronti~res'7 case, that is, they could be
proceeded against directly by a Member State competition authority under
article 88, EEC, or by the EC Commission under article 89, EEC. Absent such
process, they should be deemed provisionally valid in a national court. The
latter had no provisional validity; if in violation of article 85(1), EEC, as now
implemented by Regulation 3976/87, they were automatically void under
article 85(2), unless exempted under article 85(3) as applied by, for example,
Regulation 2671/88.18
As regards article 86, EEC, an airline or airlines might have a dominant
position where the relevant market was economically feasible transport between
two points. Such tariff agreements as mentioned above could be violative abuses
of that position by the airlines (though not the governments) concerned: if, for
example, they imposed unfair prices or conditions on competitors (too low a
price) or consumers and travel agents (too high a price), regardless of govern-
mental requirement or encouragement. In the absence of a relevant implementing
regulation (as in this case) and of any Commission action under article 89, EEC,
"it was for the competent national administrative or judicial authorities to draw
the consequences of the applicability of that prohibition" (i.e., contained in
article 86).9
The reference to "judicial authorities" in the above quotation from the
judgment is particularly interesting. It strongly suggests that ordinary national
courts can grant or refuse injunctions on the basis of article 86 violations
directly, under article 88, EEC. Until now the orthodox view, based on the
ECJ's judgment in BRT v. SABAM, 20 has been that the national "authorities"
17. Ministre Public v. Lucas Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 3 COMMON MKT. L.R. 173
(1986); see Regional Developments: European Communities, 21 INT'L LAW. 578 (1987).
18. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 239) 9 (1988); see Regional Developments: European
Communities, 23 INT'L LAW. 563 (1989).
19. See paragraph 42 of the judgment.
20. Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SABAM, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 313, 14 COMMON MKT.
L.R. 239 (1974).
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empowered to act by article 88 are limited to national competition
enforcement agencies, that is, administrative authorities. The overt recognition
that article 86 violation may consist of purely anti-consumer-interest behavior
is also interesting, many economists taking the view that such behavior is
procompetitive, not anticompetitive, as tending to attract new entrants and to
create contested markets.
Finally, as regards governmental involvement with such agreements and
practices, Member State governments which required or facilitated article 85(1)
or article 86 violations by airlines could themselves be found to be in breach of
their legal obligations under articles 3, 5 and 90(1), EEC, thereby, whether or
not the Commission had already commenced the procedure against them laid
down in article 169, EEC, or had issued a decision requiring them to cease and
desist under article 90(3). They were, however, entitled, in such a case to raise
a defense analogous to the defense available to undertakings (in casu, the
airlines) under article 90(2), that is, the entrustment of a task of general public
interest. In the case of air transport regulation, safety and technical consider-
ations could clearly be used in this way, if objectively established as require-
ments. These points on Member State governmental liability were substantially
also made by the ECJ in the Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus case
mentioned above. 2'
Two new regulations lay down procedures for relevant communications, com-
plaints, applications, and (administrative) hearings, that is, Regulation 4260/88
with respect to proceedings under Regulation 4056/86 on Maritime Transport,22
and Regulation 4261/88 with respect to proceedings under Regulation 3985/87 on
Air Transport.23
Finally, Sir Leon Brittain, the EC Commissioner responsible for competition
policy, announced that the Commission would press forward with deregulation
of air transport in the EC so that by 1992 Member State governments should
no longer be involved at all with fixing air tariffs, and by 1993 most of the
recent block exemption regulations implementing article 85(3), EEC, 2 4 to
allow airlines to adjust to deregulation, could be repealed. He warned,
however, that the EC would not tolerate the "merger mania" that followed air
transport deregulation in the USA: proposed airline mergers and takeovers
would have to be notified to, and closely scrutinized by, the Commission
under its powers to enforce articles 85(1) and 86, EEC, in the public
25interest.
21. See supra text accompanying note 10.
22. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 376) I (1988).
23. 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 376) 10 (1988).
24. See Regional Developments: European Communities, 23 INT'L LAW. 563 (1989).
25. Brussels symposium on air transport policy, reported in The Times (London), April 28,
1989.
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